The decisive influence on the shaping of the organization and tactics of the German infantry before the outbreak of World War II was, on the one hand, the experience of the previous World War, but also theoretical works created in the 1920s and 1930s, which often emphasized the need to perceive the German infantry as a tool waging an offensive war. This affected both the equipment and the organization of the German infantry division, which during the September campaign of 1939 consisted of 3 infantry regiments, each of which was divided into 3 infantry battalions, an artillery company and an anti-tank company. In addition, there were numerous support units, including: an artillery regiment with 4 artillery squadrons (including one heavy), an anti-tank battalion, a sapper battalion and a communications battalion. In total, the so-called infantry division In the first mobilization wave, there were approximately 17,700 people and had a significant artillery component, but also was abundantly equipped with machine guns. It also had modern and efficient - for those times - means of communication and command. In the course of the war, infantry divisions underwent transformation - in 1943 some of them were transformed into armored grenadier divisions. However, from 1943, the standard division of the "traditional" infantry consisted of approx. 12,500 men (and not approx. 17,700 as in 1939), and its artillery component - especially heavy artillery - was also reduced in it, while its anti-tank defense was significantly improved. It is assumed that during the entire Second World War, about 350 infantry divisions served in the Wehrmacht.
Germany (first as the Weimar Republic, and later as the Third Reich), although it was one of the largest economies in interwar Europe, did not have a stunning degree of motorization in its society. The famous project of a people's car (German: Volkswagen) started shortly before the outbreak of World War II and in fact - for civilian purposes - began to function only after 1945. The German industry as a whole was also clearly inferior to its American competitor in terms of efficiency or the production techniques used. One should also remember about the necessity to import significant amounts of crude oil by the then Germany. All this, of course, influenced the degree of motorization of the Wehrmacht. On the one hand, it had fully mechanized and motorized armored and light divisions. Also, several types of support units in infantry divisions (especially artillery and communications) were fully or mostly motorized, but horse traction was still the main means of transport for supplies in the Wehrmacht. Moreover, despite attempts to unify the German car fleet and introduce successful trucks (eg Opel Blitz) and off-road vehicles (eg Schiwamwagen or Kübelwagen), the number of types of cars used in the Wehrmacht was significant. Of course, it influenced the pace of repairs, transport, etc. Contrary to popular beliefs, it is difficult to call the entire Wehrmacht during World War II a fully motorized or mechanized army. In this field, it clearly gave way to the British Army and the US Army.